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DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP: AN EXAMINATION OF 
STAKEHOLDERS IN THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET 
 
Wen Qu*, Judy Oliver** 
 
Abstract 
 
As a consequence of the development of the Chinese economy, there has been an emergence of “new” 
stakeholder groups for the Chinese listed firms. New stakeholder groups include creditors, regulatory 
agencies, private investors, professional associations and environmentalists. With the use of secondary 
data, a review was undertaken to explore the emergence of these new stakeholder groups and discuss 
their influence over listed firms in China. The stakeholder typology developed by Mitchell et al (1997) 
is used to identify stakeholder attributes of each stakeholder group and assess their stakeholder power. 
The changes of stakeholder power over the years mirror China’s transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a more market oriented one.  
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Introduction 
 
Since the inception of economic reforms in 1979, 
China has had one of the world’s fastest-growing 
economies. The economic reforms have allowed 
market prices and private investors to play a 
significant role in production and trade, and enabled 
the Chinese economy to become substantially 
integrated into the world economy (OECD, 2010).  
The establishment of the Chinese stock market is a 
direct outcome of the economic reform in China. The 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were 
officially opened in 1990 and 1991, respectively. 
Since its establishment, the Chinese stock market has 
been transformed from a fledgling, emerging market 
to the largest emerging stock market in the world. It is 
now the biggest stock market in Asia outside Japan, 
with 2,342 firms listed on two stock exchanges and a 
total market capitalization equivalent to nearly US$3 
trillion at the end of 2011 (CSRC, 2011). At the same 
time, there were 165 million investor accounts in the 
A-share market, including 162 million individual 
investor accounts, or 98.18% of the total (CSRC, 
2011). For over a decade, publicly-listed firms have 
benefited most from the fast expansion of the Chinese 
stock market, raising more than US$96.6 billion of 
capital funds from public investors (CSRC, 2009). As 
a consequence of the rapid development of the 
Chinese economy, the emergence of new stakeholder 
groups can be seen in China, most notably private 
investors, creditors and professional associations.  
This paper aims to discuss the changes that have taken 
place in the Chinese economy which has given rise to 
these new stakeholder groups, explore the attributes 
of each stakeholder group and assess their stakeholder 
power over listed firms in China.  
 
Stakeholder Theory 
 
The underlying theoretical foundation for this study is 
stakeholder theory and stakeholder typology 
developed from it. Stakeholder theory suggests that 
firms are not just a nexus of contracts; they should go 
beyond shareholders and be responsible for a range of 
stakeholders including customers, suppliers, 
employees, creditors and communities (Freeman, 
1984).   Stakeholder management is important for 
firms to survive and be successful in the longterm as 
each stakeholder group supplies the firm with critical 
resources or makes a contribution to the firm(Deegan, 
2006). In exchange, each group expects its interests to 
be satisfied by inducements (March and Simon, 
1958).  As Hill and Jones (1992) described, investors 
provide the firm with financial capital. In exchange, 
they expect the firm to maximize the risk-adjusted 
return on their investment. Creditors provide the firm 
with finance and, in exchange, expect their loans to be 
repaid on schedule. Management and employees 
provide firms with time, skills and human capital 
commitments. In exchange, they expect fair income 
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and adequate working conditions. Customers supply 
the firm with revenues and expect value for money in 
exchange. Suppliers provide the firm with inputs and 
seek fair prices and dependable buyers in exchange. 
Local communities provide the firm with locations, 
local infrastructures and perhaps favorable tax 
treatment. In exchange, they expect corporate citizens 
who enhance and/or do not damage their quality of 
life. The general public, as tax payers, provide the 
firm with a national infrastructure. In exchange, they 
expect corporate citizens who enhance and/or do not 
damage their quality of life and do not violate the 
rules of the game established by the public through 
their legislative agents. 
As the ultimate goal of corporate decisions is 
market place success, good stakeholder-firm 
relationship management is instrumental to assure 
revenues, profits and, ultimately returns to 
shareholders (Pfeifer and Salancik, 1978; Berman et 
al., 1999).  However, this does not mean that all 
stakeholders are treated in the same way by firms due 
to managers’ time and cognitive constraints. In order 
to achieve the firm’s strategic objectives, Roberts 
(1992), suggests that one of the major roles of 
corporate management is to assess the importance of 
meeting different stakeholders’ demands because as 
stakeholder power increases, the importance of 
meeting stakeholders’ demands increases accordingly.  
This view is supported by others who consider that 
given the constraints faced by managers they will give 
their attention to the more “powerful” stakeholders 
(Scott and Lane, 2000; Bailey et al., 2000; and Nasi et 
al., 1997).  Power is viewed as a function of the 
stakeholder’s degree of control over resources 
required by the firm, especially financial resources 
(Ullmann, 1985).For example, a study by Neu et al. 
(1998) found that firms were more responsive to the 
demands or concerns of financial stakeholders 
including shareholders, creditors and government 
regulators, than the concerns of environmentalists.  
Another challenge to corporate management is in 
relation to their operating and reporting behaviors 
because of the expectation and power relativities of 
various stakeholder groups changing over time 
(Friedman and Miles, 2002; Unerman and Bennett, 
2004).   
The rapid changes in the Chinese economy over 
the last thirty years and the growth and maturity of the 
stock market allows for the examination of how new 
stakeholder groups have emerged as a consequence of 
the changing market conditions and  to examine the 
power relativities of each stakeholder group.   
 
Methodology 
 
Secondary data sources will be used to identify major 
stakeholders and their attributes relating to the 
Chinese stock market. To assist with the analysis 
reference will be made to the stakeholder typology 
developed by Mitchell et al. (1997).  The typology 
classifies stakeholders into latent stakeholders, 
expectant stakeholders and definitive stakeholders 
depending on the possession of one, two or all three 
relationships attributes: power, legitimacy and 
urgency. The power attribute refers to a stakeholder’s 
power to influence the firm, and power is defined by 
Pfeifer (1981, p.3) as “a relationship among social 
actors in which one social actor, A, can get another 
social actor, B, to do something that B would not 
otherwise have done”. The legitimacy attribute refers 
to the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship 
with the firm and, legitimacy in this context, is 
defined as a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially-constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs and definitions. Legitimacy 
of a claim on a firm is based on contract, exchange, 
legal title, moral right, at-risk status or moral interest 
in the harms and benefits generated by company 
actions (Agle et al., 1999). Power and legitimacy are 
defined as core stakeholder attributes. The urgency 
attribute refers to the urgency of the stakeholder’s 
claim on the firm, and urgency is defined as the 
degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate 
attention. Agle et al. (1999) further explain that 
stakeholder urgency is a multidimensional notion that 
includes both criticality and temporality, with a 
stakeholder claim considered to be urgent both when 
it is important and when delay in paying attention to it 
is unacceptable.  
Latent stakeholders are those possessing only 
one of the three attributes and include dominant 
(power), discretionary (legitimacy) and demanding 
(urgency) stakeholders. Expectant stakeholders are 
those possessing two attributes, and include dominant 
(power and legitimacy), dependent (legitimacy and 
urgency) and dangerous (power and urgency) 
stakeholders. Definitive stakeholders are those 
possessing all three attributes. Individuals or entities 
possessing none of the attributes are non-stakeholders 
or potential stakeholders.  
As mentioned earlier there is a view that 
managers give their attention to certain stakeholders 
who are deemed more “powerful” and the theory of 
stakeholder salience predicts that firms do not respond 
to all stakeholders equally, rather, managers prioritize 
stakeholder relationships. Mitchell et al. (1997) define 
stakeholder salience as the degree to which managers 
give priority to competing stakeholder claims. For 
example, shareholders and creditors place emphasis 
on firms’ profitability and wealth creation, while 
public interest groups, including environmentalists, 
focus on the impact of firms’ operations on the 
environment. Stakeholder salience is positively 
associated with the cumulative number of the three 
stakeholder attributes (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Stakeholder salience will be high where all three of 
the stakeholder attributes - power, legitimacy and 
urgency - are perceived by managers to be present. 
Stakeholder salience will be low where only one of 
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the stakeholder attributes is perceived by managers to 
be present. The Mitchell et al. (1997) theoretical 
model of stakeholder salience is tested and confirmed 
by Agle et al. (1999). The empirical results of Agle et 
al. (1999) confirm that, in the minds of CEOs, the 
stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy and 
urgency are individually and cumulatively related to 
stakeholder salience. Their findings suggest that these 
stakeholder attributes affect the degree to which top 
managers give priority to competing stakeholders.  
The stakeholder typology developed by Mitchell 
et al. (1997)is shown in figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1. Stakeholder typology: one, two or three attributes present 
 
 
Source: Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997, p. 874 
 
Discussion  
 
Prior to 1978, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
China were rigidly controlled by the Chinese 
government with all equipment and raw materials 
supplied by the government. As part of the central 
planning system, the government determined the 
prices of material, products, suppliers and customers 
of SOEs. The control of China’s enterprises rested 
primarily with the inside nominated managers who, in 
turn, were often controlled and supported in various 
forms by the Party and ministerial associates (Tam, 
2002). The function of managers, who served as the 
Party’s agents, was solely to supervise the production 
process and ensure the actualization of government 
plans (Lin and Tan, 1999). In terms of capital 
resources of SOEs, state funds were collected through 
fiscal and other means of revenue collection and 
siphoned off to SOEs. The government, therefore, 
placed little weight on commercial banking and the 
capital market as active players in financial 
intermediation (Suzuki et al., 2008). Due to the 
government being the sole stakeholder of the SOEs, 
the Chinese economy had stagnated for a long period 
of time. The government gained the profits but also 
bore the losses as the ultimate owner of the SOEs, and 
managers and employees had no incentives to 
maximize the profitability of the SOEs (Xu and 
Wang, 1999). As a consequence this bred a culture of 
low productivity in SOEs. 
As part of the economic reform in China, SOE 
reforms were launched in 1978. The essence of SOE 
reforms was a gradual relaxation of state central 
planning, implementation of various kinds of profit 
sharing schemes and increased autonomy over 
decision-making conferred to SOEs, and especially to 
the managers of SOEs (Qiang, 2003; Ren et al., 
2005).  As a consequence of these reforms new 
stakeholder groups have emerged, in particular, 
creditors, public investors, regulatory agencies, 
professional associations and environmentalists.  We 
devote the following sections to thediscussion of these 
emerging stakeholder groups’ stakeholderattributes 
and relative power base by reference to the Mitchell et 
al. (1997) typology.  
 
Creditor Stakeholder Group 
 
In respect of financing the SOEs’ operations, the 
Chinese government in 1983 transformed the state 
budget allocations into loans, which were funded by 
four state-owned commercial banks. The state-owned 
bank loans, therefore, replaced the government budget 
allocation and the major creditor stakeholder of SOEs 
was changed from the Chinese government to state-
owned banks. Although banks were the main financial 
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resource provider of SOEs, banks did not have any 
power over SOEs in terms of whether to lend funds to 
them. In fact, the government prevented banks from 
operating on purely commercial terms with revenue 
generating activities, by forcing banks to provide 
subsidized lending to SOEs.  
Since the emergence of the capital market in 
China in the early 1990’s, some SOEs have been 
transformed into shareholding companies, obtaining 
funds for further development and expansion from 
public investors. However, the majority of poorly-
managed and inefficient SOEs in China still relied 
upon bank loans. To avoid the potential social unrest 
caused by a high unemployment rate, the government 
felt obligated to support unprofitable SOEs by 
requesting state-owned commercial banks to extend 
loans or even provide the SOEs with more funds, with 
little consideration given to the borrowers’ repayment 
capacity (Xu, 2005). This situation led to the many 
non-performing loans (NPL) which the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) reported 
was the equivalent US$340 billion in NPLs in the 
financial system by the end of 2004. Pricewaterhouse 
Cooper’s China NPL Investor Survey 2004, however, 
reveals a figure as high as US$500 billion (Xu, 
2005).The Chinese government assisted state-owned 
commercial banks to “unload” huge non-performing 
loans from their books. In 1999, as a solution for 
tackling the NPL problem, the government 
established four financial asset management 
companies (AMCs) and transferred the equivalent of 
US$55 billion of non-performing loans to those 
companies (Xinhua Press, 2005). The function of 
AMCs is to focus exclusively on debt collection. In 
addition, the four AMCs are allowed to negotiate with 
the borrowing state-owned enterprises and conduct a 
series of debt-to-equity swaps. In this way, the debts 
are transferred into equities and the AMCs have 
gained control over some enterprises (China Daily, 
2005). The massive disposal of NPLs to AMCs has 
dramatically reduced the NPL ratio of banks and 
financial institutions.   
As a result of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreement, China has opened the banking and 
financial service market to foreign financial rivals, 
with public listing one of the strategies to achieve 
these goals.  This has led the banking and financial 
institution industry in China to be more independent, 
transparent and profit-driven. By the end of 2011 
there were twenty-eight national and regional 
commercial banks listed in the Chinese stock market. 
The two most publicized public listings are the China 
Construction Bank and the Bank of China. The former 
was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2005 
and the latter on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 
2006. The other two state-owned commercial banks, 
China Industrial and Commercial Bank and China 
Agrisocial Bank, were listed in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. 
The listing of commercial banks and the further 
opening up of the banking market to foreign financial 
institutions has led to some positive changes in the 
Chinese banking industry (Petkova, 2008). First, the 
Chinese banks began to adopt international practices 
regarding balance sheet criteria in which the capital 
ratios are based on the risk involved. Secondly, banks 
started to apply commercial lending criteria. In their 
lending activities, banks have been disconnected from 
the government-based policy and have shifted to 
lending based on generally accepted commercial 
banking techniques. To reduce NPLs, banks have 
strengthened the finances and management of SOEs. 
In 2007, the National People’s Congress passed the 
new Bankruptcy Law, aiming to reduce the NPLs by 
ensuring better respect for creditors’ rights. In the 
same year, some steps were taken to build national 
standards and networks for credit assessment. The 
central bank of China, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC), has sought to develop a national credit 
information database and has urged banks to unify 
regulations. The China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) has issued the Tentative 
Procedures for the Administration of Credit Ratings in 
the Securities Market (Petkova, 2008). 
Therefore, the nature of the creditor for Chinese 
firms has changed significantly with the role overtime 
shifting from the government to private financiers. 
Financial Institutions have become one of the main 
sources of SOEs’ capital when state-owned bank 
loans replaced the government’s budget allocation in 
the early 1980s (Xu, 2005). As creditors for listed 
firms, the power possessed by this stakeholder group 
has changed during the past two decades. In the early 
stage of the economic reform, banks were under 
pressure from the government to provide “policy 
loans” to SOEs (Petkova, 2008). Banks, therefore, had 
no power to influence SOEs’ performance and 
information disclosure. They also did not have an 
urgent claim over the actualization of their economic 
stake. Therefore, between the early 1980s and mid-
1990s, creditors could only be classified as a 
discretionary stakeholder of SOEs. Factors such as the 
entrance of China into the WTO, the opening up of 
the Chinese banking market and the listing of several 
large commercial banks, have all contributed to the 
changes in the operation of the banking system in 
China. Now, profit-oriented banks provide firms with 
loans on commercial terms. Regardless of being state-
owned or private, commercial banks were expected to 
earn interest revenue from borrowers and have their 
loans repaid. Creditors now have a stronger economic 
stake in listed firms. The power and urgency 
possessed by the state-owned banks over listed firms 
gradually increased with the disconnection between 
the government’s loan policies and banks’ 
commercial activities. Banks can now independently 
determine which enterprises they want to lend funds 
to and how to avoid non-performing loans (NPLs). 
Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese banks have 
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developed stakeholder attributes of power and 
urgency. Therefore, financial institutions can nowbe 
classified as a definitive stakeholder of listed firms in 
the Chinese stock market. 
 
Regulatory Agency Stakeholder Group 
 
In the Chinese stock market, the regulatory agency 
group includes the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the 
China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.By the 
use of the political process, regulatory agencies in 
China have political power (Freeman and Reed, 1983) 
over listed firms to ensure that the political stake of 
the Chinese government is actualized. The MOF has 
authoritative power over listed firms in terms of 
following accounting regulations and standards. The 
CSRC has power to regulate listed firms’ conduct and 
information disclosure. The CSRC and both stock 
exchanges have employed a series of strategies and 
actions to achieve “investor protection”. These actions 
include stipulating accounting and disclosure 
regulations, establishing a corporate governance 
régime, providing training for investors and 
independent directors, and imposing public sanctions 
against listed firms. These actions suggest an 
increased willingness by the Chinese leadership to 
subordinate the interests of controlling shareholders to 
the interests of other shareholders (Berkman, 2008). 
They have sent a clear and strong signal to listed 
firms over the years, that to legitimate their status in 
the Chinese stock market, listed firms need to devote 
themselves to protecting minority investors’ interests 
by disclosing transparent information to investors. 
Politically, a healthy capital market serves the 
government to further open up China’s economy, 
enhance enterprise reform and attract more 
investments from both domestic and overseas 
investors. However, due to the problems of “one 
dominating state-owned share monopoly” and 
“insider control”, the minority or public investors’ 
interests have been expropriated by majority 
shareholders since the establishment of the stock 
market in China. Over the years, “investor protection” 
has been acknowledged by the regulatory agency 
group as one of the most important measures for 
supporting the steady growth of the Chinese stock 
market.In emerging markets with relatively weak 
legal systems, regulators can provide an effective 
substitute for ineffective judicial enforcement and 
provide an investor protection role (Glaeser et al., 
(2002; Chen et al., 2005; Berkman, 2008).In China, 
although the Chinese government has enacted the 
Company Law and the Security Law in recent years, 
the overall legal system is still relatively primitive by 
the standards of capitalist countries (Berkman, 2008). 
China’s first civil compensation suit regarding a 
securities case reflects on one hand, the activism of 
the investment community in China. On the other 
hand, as Chen et al. (2005) suggest, one successful 
civil suit in the first 12 years of the Chinese stock 
market is a testament to the lack of legal redress in 
securities cases. Under the Security Law, a civil case 
against a listed firm can only be brought to the court 
after the CSRC has made an investigation. Class 
action lawsuits are not possible in China and so a 
lawsuit brought by an individual investor is very 
costly and has a low probability of success (Chen et 
al., 2005). 
Aiming to promote and protect investor interest, 
the CSRC introduces, on average, twenty major 
policies each year to address the stock issue system, 
trading and supervision of listed firms (People’s 
Daily, 2005c). Since the establishment of the CSRC 
in 1992, more than 300 regulations, rules, standards 
and guidelines concerning the securities market have 
been stipulated by the MOF and the CSRC. In respect 
of its enforcement, the CSRC declares that its major 
responsibilities are supervising security markets and 
exercising vertical power of authority over the 
regional and provincial supervisory institutions of the 
market, and investigating and penalizing activities 
violating securities and futures laws and regulations. 
The CSRC acknowledges that investors are expecting 
stronger supervision of listed firms’ information. 
Firms that fail to provide the capital market with 
timely, adequate and transparent information will face 
severe penalties from the CSRC (People’s Daily, 
2005a). In the early and mid-1990s, the CSRC 
enforcement actions were weak and punishment was 
lax. Thus, in the earlier days, the CSRC was viewed 
as being ineffective (Chen et al., 2005). From 1998, 
the CSRC gained overall regulatory power and has 
over-riding control over the securities industry. 
To enforce the Chinese accounting standards, the 
MOF, jointly with the CSRC, supervise financial 
accounting information disclosures made by listed 
firms on the Chinese stock market. The CSRC has the 
power to punish listed firms and their auditors if non-
compliance with accounting standards and audit 
criteria or false financial information is found. 
Penalties for the CPA firms that do not apply 
appropriate standards can include cancellation of 
licenses, temporarily or permanently. By the end of 
2004, the CSRC had completed the investigation of 
851 cases and 953 related persons had been punished, 
most for disobeying the accounting standards and 
showing false information in their reports (CSRC, 
2005). 
The CSRC has also publicly pledged to improve 
the transparency of its own work to ensure the 
efficiency of capital market reforms and to curb 
corruption. In 2005, the CSRC further implemented 
the stock market reform plans mapped out by the 
State Council and steadily opened up the market. 
According to the chairman of the CSRC, strong 
protection of the interests of public investors is the 
priority for the reforms, and an accountability culture 
needs to be developed (CSRC, 2000). The CSRC has 
also increased its interaction with the media and the 
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public investors, such as offering more detailed 
introductions of the new policies to investors and 
conducting more interviews with the media. 
Under the close supervision of the CSRC, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges established 
their own listing rules in 1998 and strengthened their 
roles in supervising information disclosure. While 
endeavoring to provide facilities for the securities 
trading and monitoring thereof, the two stock 
exchanges also participated in championing the 
improvement of corporate governance, especially in 
respect of protecting investors’ interests and the 
transparency of information disclosure. In 2003, the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued the Guidelines on 
Protection of Investor Rights and Interests for Small 
and Medium Enterprises Board. Article 12 of this 
guideline stresses that listed companies should 
“truthfully, accurately, completely and timely disclose 
the information that may significantly impact the 
price of stocks and derivatives or the decision-making 
of investors, and such information must not contain 
falsehoods, misleading statements or material 
omissions. The person with disclosure obligation 
shall, based on the principle of good faith, voluntarily 
disclose other information that is not required by 
laws, administrative regulations and rules, as well as 
the rules of the Exchange. Listed firms shall ensure 
that investors have equal access to the information 
disclosed and shall not make selective disclosure”. 
Article 13 emphasizes that “when making voluntary 
disclosure of forward-looking financial information, 
listed companies shall follow the internal audit 
procedures, issue risk warnings to investors stating 
the assumption basis for such forward-looking 
information and any uncertainty involved and, in 
accordance with actual conditions and in a timely 
manner, modify the information previously 
disclosed”. 
In addition to releasing and implementing rules 
to regulate information disclosure by listed firms and 
safeguard the interest of public shareholders, these 
two stock exchanges also take some action to 
maintain the sustained development of the stock 
market. They monitor the dominant shareholders’ 
illegal use of funds of listed companies; in 
conjunction with the assistance of local governments, 
they enforce state shareholders to return funds to 
listed companies to ensure the capital resources raised 
from the stock exchange are used for legitimized 
purposes. The regulatory department within the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange has also released reports to 
expose the bad behavior of some security investment 
companies in the stock market. It is complementary to 
Chinese accounting standards that disclosure is 
reasonable and systematically and efficiently 
enforced. It also helps to ensure that the Chinese 
accounting standards are properly implemented. 
Taking a similar attitude as the CSRC in respect of 
investor protection, the two stock exchanges also 
undertake strong enforcement to promote transparent 
disclosure in the stock market. 
Market reactions to the CSRC’s actions are 
investigated by Chen et al. (2005) and Berkman 
(2008). Chen et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence 
on the impact of the regulatory agencies’ enforcement 
actions on the valuation of listed firms. In their study, 
the authors identify 169 enforcement actions carried 
out by the CSRC in the period 1999-2003. Using 
event study research methodology, Chen et al. (2005) 
find that enforcement actions implemented by the 
CSRC have a negative impact on stock prices, with 
most firms suffering wealth losses of around 1-2% in 
the 5 days surrounding the event. Moreover, they find 
that firms have a greater rate of auditor change; a 
much higher incidence of qualified audit opinions; 
increased CEO turnover; and wider bid-ask spreads. 
The negative stock returns and the costly economic 
consequences for listed firms suggest that the 
regulatory agencies in the Chinese stock market have 
credibility and their actions have “teeth”. 
Berkman (2008) adopts an event study 
methodology to examine the stock market reactions to 
three newly-released regulations by the CSRC aimed 
at reducing expropriation from public investors by 
controlling shareholders. The three regulations were 
all introduced in the second quarter of 2000 and were 
partly motivated by China’s successful attempt to gain 
entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The first new regulation (released on May 18, 2000) 
substantially increased the rights of public investors at 
a firms’ annual shareholders’ meeting. The second 
regulation (released on June 6, 2000) prohibited the 
issuance of loan guarantees by a firm to its controlling 
shareholder, and the third regulation (released on June 
26, 2000) improved the transparency and regulation 
of asset transfers to related parties. Berkman (2008) 
finds significant positive abnormal returns accrue to 
firms with weak governance, as proxied by the value 
of related-party transactions and a variety of less 
direct measures. These results are interpreted as 
evidence that securities market regulation can be 
effective in protecting public investors from 
expropriation in a country like China with weak 
judicial enforcement. 
The regulatory agency group in the Chinese 
stock market has three strong stakeholder-attributes. 
This group legitimates its existence by establishing 
the regulatory framework of corporate disclosure in 
the Chinese stock market. The enforcement of the 
regulations and sanctions it has imposed show its 
power and urgency over listed firms in the stock 
market. If listed firms are de-listed by the stock 
exchange, not only do they lose an important source 
of capital, but also their reputation in society is 
damaged. Accordingly, the regulatory agency group 
can be identified as a definitive stakeholder for listed 
firms in the Chinese stock market. 
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Investor Stakeholder Group 
 
Individual investors have emerged in Chinese society 
since the beginning of the 1990s, when stock 
exchanges were opened in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
As part of the fiscal policy of the Chinese 
government, the interest rates in China have remained 
low which has led some investors to seek higher rates 
outside of traditional savings accounts. The prosperity 
of the Chinese stock market has attracted increasingly 
more residents to invest their savings in relatively 
high-risk income stocks, funds and other investment 
devices. As a result, many have withdrawn money 
from banks and given it to security companies in the 
form of cash deposits (People’s Daily, 2005b). This is 
evidenced in a CSRC (2000) report which states that 
the Chinese stock market is primarily made up of 
individual investors, and who are segmented, 
segregated and with low shareholding ratios. As 
minority shareholders of listed firms, individual 
shareholders have, on average, no more than 0.3% of 
the seats on the board of directors or supervisory 
board, even though they are a group possessing 
approximately one-third of the shares (Xu and Wang, 
1999). Various factors have restricted individual 
shareholders’ participation in the management and 
significant decision-making of listed firms. These 
include low shareholdings by individual shareholders, 
geography and the time zone differences (CSRC, 
2000). Thus, the absence of cumulative voting 
procedures has significantly enhanced the control 
rights of a firm’s largest shareholder. 
Chinese domestic investors have a reputation for 
seeking short-term trading profit rather than long-term 
dividend income and investment growth, which is 
evidenced by the short shareholding periods of 1-2 
months in 1995, and 5.8 months in 2002, compared to 
the average 18 months share holding period in the US 
(Deng and Wang, 2006). Such short investment 
horizons indicate that small individual shareholders 
neither have the willingness nor the capacity to 
monitor the management of listed firms closely. After 
more than a decade of development in the Chinese 
stock market, the number of individual investor 
accounts has increased from 8.35 million in 1992 to 
nearly 162 million by the end of 2011. The individual 
Chinese investors are also increasingly interested in 
the performance of listed firms and macroeconomic 
development when investing in the Chinese stock 
market. The value-oriented investment ideology is 
becoming more acceptable; and traders have been 
reported as becoming more rational and mature.  
The Chinese public investors have also 
progressively become aware that they can protect 
their interests through legal mechanisms. In 2001, 
nearly 900 compensation cases in relation to 
fraudulent financial statements, insider trading and 
market manipulation were lodged in the lower courts 
(People’s Daily, 2001). In early 2002, two reputable 
law firms filed complaints in the court on behalf of 
363 investors and 700 investors who suffered from 
financial losses caused by fraudulent financial 
information disclosed by two listed firms. In 
November 2002, eleven individual investors obtained 
compensation of RMB 224,096 Yuan (US$28,012) 
from Hongguan Shiye and a related security 
underwriting company after a lawsuit lasting nearly 
four years. This marks the success of the first civil 
compensation case in China over fraudulent financial 
information. The case reflects the attitude of 
government authorities and regulatory agencies 
towards further legal enforcement of various 
regulations in respect of listed companies (Shao, 
2003).  
Based on Mitchell et al. (1997) typology, the 
investor group has one strong attribute, namely, 
urgency. Investors can buy or sell their shares freely. 
If they can’t have the management changed via their 
voting powers, they may sell their shares in the stock 
market and this action may lead to the devaluation of 
a firm’s share price. As investors have equity stakes 
in listed firms, they expect firms to make transparent 
disclosures to assist them in making efficient 
decisions in terms of how to allocate their financial 
resources. This group, however, does not have strong 
power over listed firms. Although investors in China 
have begun to use legal mechanisms to protect their 
interests from exploitation by majority owners, their 
actions are only strong enough to put external 
demands and pressure on listed firms to make 
transparent disclosures, rather than imposing 
sanctions on firms directly (Chen et al., 2005). With 
strong urgency and legitimacy but weak authoritative 
power, the investor group can only be classified as a 
dependent stakeholder of listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market. 
 
Accounting Profession 
 
In ancient China, in an economy which was 
dominated by small scale family businesses, the role 
of accountants in respect of strategic management and 
decision-making in Chinese society was not well 
regarded.Traditional Chinese culture considers 
merchants and people related to industry as inferior to 
other professions. Confucian philosophy suggests that 
“the mind of the superior man is conversant with 
righteousness; the mind of the mean man is 
conversant with gain” (Gao and Handley-Schachler, 
2003). However, the function of accountants has 
changed since the economic and enterprise reforms in 
China. The rapid growth of accounting firms during 
the past fifteen years is the consequence of the 
introduction of massive new accounting regulations, 
standards and the trend of international accounting 
harmonization. The important role that accountants 
can play in improving business management and 
corporate governance has been recognized and this 
recognition has led to the development of a 
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certification process for the accounting workforce 
(Groom and Sims, 2005). 
The establishment of the Chinese Institute of 
CPAs (CICPA) was a landmark event in the 
development of the CPA profession in China (Tang 
and Lau, 2000). The CICPA is a quasi-government 
organization and reports to the MOF. The CICPA’s 
main responsibilities include registering CPAs and 
public accounting firms and conducting the entrance 
examination. In January 1994, the People’s Republic 
of China Registered Accountant Law (Certified Public 
Accountants Act) was promulgated by the MOF. The 
Act defines the scope of a CPA’s role, including 
external auditing as distinct from internal auditing and 
government auditing, and other accounting 
consultancy work such as the design of accounting 
systems, performing accounting projects for 
management and providing advice on taxation, 
business registration and staff training. 
A further step in the development of an 
independent profession has been the de-linking of 
CPA firms from sponsoring agents, usually 
government departments and institutions, since 1998. 
With the growth of the market economy, the 
government’s tight control over CICPA has become 
impractical and now accounting firms are formed as 
either independent partnerships or limited liability 
companies. The de-linking is a sign of the intention of 
the government to abandon direct control over CPA 
practices. CPA professional services have been 
subject to professional, legal and market discipline 
since then. 
An important role has been played by the 
independent accounting and auditing firms in 
boosting investors’ confidence in the Chinese stock 
market. In 1998, a survey was conducted by the 
CICPA among 773 listed companies as part of an 
“accounting and auditing market cleaning campaign” 
implemented between 1997 and 1999 in China. The 
results show that there was a significant improvement 
in respect of the quality of accounting and auditing 
work. Of the 773 companies, there were 38 
companies that received qualified auditor’s opinion, 
55 companies were offered an auditing opinion with 
the attachment of an explanation. One auditing firm 
released a qualified auditor report to a listed firm and 
one auditing firm refused to issue an audit report to a 
listed firm. In total, 12.29% of auditing firms 
expressed their disagreement to the financial 
information provided by the listed firms. Prior to that, 
the issuing of a qualified auditor report to a listed firm 
by an auditing firm had never previously happened. 
The implication of these actions is that accountants in 
China have improved their professionalism and sense 
of responsibility to public investors. A survey 
conducted by Chinese media in June 1998 also 
showed that the public’s confidence in qualified 
accountants had improved from 45% in 1994 to 81%. 
The image and creditability of independent 
accounting and auditing firms have gradually 
improved. However, the quality of services provided 
by domestic accounting and auditing firms is still far 
from satisfactory, especially in respect of professional 
ethics. In order to make higher profits, some 
accounting firms assist their clients to produce 
fraudulent financial information. Due to a lack of any 
sense of risk, these accounting firms do not seem to 
realize that public investors rely upon an auditor’s 
opinion to make decisions regarding capital 
investment. The majority of corporate scandals 
including Hongguan Shiye and Qiongminyuan can be 
related to the deceptive role played by external 
accounting and auditing firms(Xiao et al., 2004). 
This professional body has played a positive role 
in improving the quality of financial disclosure in the 
Chinese stock market. However, as one of the 
stakeholders of listed firms, CICPA only possesses 
one of the three stakeholder sorting criteria – 
legitimacy. CICPA doesn’t have power and urgency 
over listed firms and CPA firms. Rather, it is the 
CSRC and the MOF that possess authoritative power 
over listed firms and CPA firms. As mentioned 
previously, it is the CSRC and the MOF that can 
impose a penalty on CPA firms that do not apply 
appropriate standards and such a penalty can include 
cancellation of a CPA firm’s license, either 
temporarily or permanently. Therefore, by reference 
to the Mitchell et al. (1997) typology the CICPA can 
only be classified as a discretionary stakeholder of 
listed firms in the Chinese stock market, as it cannot 
threaten listed firms’ capital resources. 
 
Environmentalists 
 
Another stakeholder group of listed firms are 
environmentalists and the environmental authority. 
The State Environmental Protection Administration 
(SEPA) has issued several regulations and provisions 
related to environmental disclosure and reporting. The 
Management Provision on Reporting and Registration 
on Pollutant Emissions (1992) was the earliest 
regulation, requiring enterprises to report to the 
government the details of the pollutants they are 
responsible for and how they are managed. The 
Environmental Management Provision for 
Construction (1998) requires enterprises that run 
construction projects to produce an Environmental 
Impact Assessment report (EIA). The Bulletin on 
Information Disclosure for Corporate Environmental 
Performance (2003) stipulates that non-compliant 
enterprises should disclose their corporate 
environmental performance to the public. Local 
environmental protection bureaux must release 
corporate non-compliance lists periodically to the 
public through newspapers and television. This 
regulation requires that listed firms must disclose their 
environmental performance information for the 
previous year by March 31st every year. Another 
regulation released in 2003, Regulations on the 
Environmental Inspection of Companies Accessing or 
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Refinancing from the Stock Market, aims to prevent 
environmental risk associated with listed firms from 
certain heavily polluting industries such as metal, 
chemicals, oil, coal, thermal power and construction 
materials. The CSRC requires firms wanting to be 
listed on the Chinese stock exchanges to include their 
environmental risk and how they meet environmental 
standards and environment-related measurements in 
their prospectus of Initial Public Offerings (IPO), 
application files for IPO and legal statement and 
working reports of lawyers for IPO. 
The survey of annual reports of 1195 listed firms 
conducted in 2003 by Guo (2005) concludes that 
firms in China pay less attention to corporate 
environmental reporting and disclosure compared to 
some of their western counterparts. As most of the 
regulations in the Chinese stock market focus on 
improving corporate disclosure and reporting of 
firms’ financial performance rather than social and 
environmental issues, environmental disclosure is not 
popular, and annual reports of listed firms rarely 
include environmental issues. Although possessing 
legitimacy attributes, environmentalists do not have 
strong power and urgency over the financial resources 
of listed firms and therefore can be classified as 
discretionary stakeholders of listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market. 
Based on the discussion above concerning the 
emergence of new stakeholders and the changing 
power of particular stakeholder groups, Table 1 
summarizes stakeholders and their attributes in the 
Chinese stock market. 
 
Table 1. Stakeholders and stakeholder attributes in the Chinese stock market 
 
Stakeholder group 
 
Power Legitimacy Urgency Classification 
Creditor 
 
High High High Definitive stakeholder 
Regulatory agency  
 
High High High Definitive stakeholder 
Investor 
 
Low High High Dependent stakeholder 
Accounting Profession Low High Low Discretionary stakeholder 
Environmentalist 
 
Low High Low Discretionary stakeholder 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a consequence of the development of the 
Chinese economy, there has been an emergence of 
“new” stakeholder groups.  New stakeholder groups 
include creditors, regulatory agencies, investors, 
professional associations and environmentalists.  
Applying Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder 
typology, the assessment of stakeholder attributes 
clearly shows the regulatory agency group is the most 
powerful stakeholder group for listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market. The MOF, the CSRC and the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges can be 
jointly identified as definitive stakeholders, as they 
possess three strong stakeholder attributes, namely, 
power, legitimacy and urgency over the capital 
resources of listed firms. Although the creditor group 
is also considered a definitive stakeholder, the 
regulatory agency group has political power which we 
consider gives this group the number one position.  
To be continuously listed in the Chinese stock market 
and obtain financial resources from shareholders, 
listed firms must follow the rules and regulations 
enforced by those regulatory agencies.In relation to 
the creditor group the changed banking environment 
in China has transferred this stakeholder group from a 
discretionary stakeholder to a definitive stakeholder. 
The creditor group now possesses three stakeholder 
attributes that are closely related to the economic 
stake creditors have in listed firms. Being profit-
oriented itself, this group possesses power to control 
the capital resources relied upon by listed firms.  
Investors are dependent stakeholders and, due to 
relatively weak legal mechanisms, have limited power 
over listed firms. However, investors strongly exhibit 
one of the attributes, namely, urgency. They can take 
immediate actions by selling their shares when they 
feel their legitimate interests are not being served by 
the management of listed firms. The professional 
association, CICPA, exhibits strong legitimacy but 
lacks power and urgency over listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market, which makes it a discretionary 
stakeholder. Environmentalists have emerged as a 
stakeholder group more recently with the greater 
awareness given to corporate environmental 
performance and disclosure to the public. Like the 
professional associations, Environmentalists would be 
considered discretionary stakeholders as they only 
have the legitimacy attribute.  Therefore, as a result of 
the economic reforms in China we can see the change 
in ownership structures of firms from state-owned 
enterprises where the sole stakeholder was the 
Government to a westernized capital market with 
listed firms and multiple stakeholders.  This change 
will prompt the management of listed firms in China 
to be more aware of the need for stakeholder 
management to be successful into the future.  
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